Radio, Television and the Community by Anawalt, Howard C.
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 11 | Number 2 Article 2
1-1-1971
Radio, Television and the Community
Howard C. Anawalt
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Howard C. Anawalt, Radio, Television and the Community, 11 Santa Clara Lawyer 229 (1971).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol11/iss2/2
RADIO, TELEVISION AND THE
COMMUNITY
Howard C. Anawalt*
I. SORRY, CABLE TROUBLE
In 1955, Thurgood Marshall, who was then the general counsel
for the NAACP, was interviewed on a television program which was
carried nationwide. At the time of the scheduled show, viewers of
local television station WLBT in Jackson, Mississippi were suddenly
confronted with a sign "Sorry, Cable Trouble." Because of the sign
the people of the Jackson area missed an opportunity to see one of
the leading figures in the struggle for racial equality speak on that
subject.
The NAACP complained to the Federal Communications
Commission about the incident. In response to the complaint,
Mr. Beard, an official of WLBT wrote to the Commission stating
that:
As it has been our policy not to permit local or network propaganda
on either side [of the segregation issues] to be broadcast or telecast,
Thurgood Marshall's interview on the NBC-TV program 'Home' was
not telecast. If it had been telecast, then we would have been obligated
to make equal time available to the other side.'
In 1955 it would have been difficult to imagine a more important
kind of public service broadcasting than the comments of Mr. Mar-
shall (now Justice Marshall) in the capital of Mississippi during the
first year of the Brown desegregation decision. U.S. News and
World Report stated in its issue for June 17, 1955, that ".
Thurgood Marshall knows his toughest fight lies ahead. The chief
counsel for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People won a historic Supreme Court decision with even tempered
arguments, hopes to wear down Southern opposition with persuasive-
ness backed with legal pressure."' But in Jackson, whose population
was forty to fifty percent black, there was "cable trouble."
For many years after 1955, WLBT continued a programming
heavily biased in favor of segregation of races. It featured a series of
* Associate Professor, University of Santa Clara School of Law.
1 In re Application of Lamar Life Broadcasting Company, 37 F.C.C. 1143, 1145,
5 P. & F. Radio Reg. 2d 205 (1965).
2 U.S. NEWS & WORLD RPT., June 17, 1955, at 16.
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editorials and comments against James Meredith's entry into the
University of Mississippi and spot commercials urging that "every
white man and woman in Mississippi should be a Citizen's Council
member" in order to protect your family from these "Communist
led integration attempts." In 1963, 1964 and 1965, programming
practices of WLBT were a subject of FCC attention and investiga-
tion. When the matter of the renewal of WLBT's license was passed
upon in 1965, the FCC stated:
... there is no question as to the licensee's right to present the above
programming; it, of course, had the full right to do so. The question is
rather whether the licensee complied with the requirements of the fair-
ness doctrine-i.e., whether, having presented one side of a contro-
versial issue of public importance, it sought affirmatively to encourage
and implement the presentation of contrasting viewpoints. The licensee's
response is not fully satisfactory in this respect.
8
The FCC did two things with respect to the "not fully satisfac-
tory" response of the station. First of all it ruled that the citizens and
the church organization which had filed the complaints against the
conduct of the station had no standing to participate in the decision
on license renewal of WLBT.
[M]embers of the general public who do not show a direct causal
relationship between the action being protested and some injury of a
tangible and substantial nature have no standing purely as members
of the general public . . . Here petitioners, as members of a minority
group, can assert no greater interest or claim of injury than the members
of the general public.4
Secondly, the FCC renewed the station's license for a one year
probationary period subject to a set of conditions requiring that the
station comply strictly with the fairness doctrine, have programming
discussions with community and civil rights leaders, that it cease
discriminatory programming patterns and that it report in detail on
its efforts to accomplish the requirements.
In this posture the case made the first of two spectacular
appearances in the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia.5 The Court reversed the FCC on the issue of standing,
holding that one or more of complaining persons or organizations
must be accorded standing before the FCC as responsible representa-
tives to assert that granting a license would not be in the public
interest. The Court also held that the conditional license grant was
3 37 F.C.C. at 1146.
4 Id.
5 Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d
994 (D.C. Cir. 1966); 425 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See also note 75 infra and ac-
companying text.
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error because a history of programming misconduct as alleged-
disproportionate amount of commercials, denial of fair presentation
of controversy, and discrimination against churches and ethnic
groups-would as a matter of law preclude the required affirmative
finding that a renewal of the license would serve the public interest.
The controversy that centered around WLBT for fifteen years
contains issues which I will discuss: What right does the public
have to receive information by broadcast? What right do community
groups have to an opportunity to express their ideas over radio and
television? What rights do community groups have to affect broad-
casting service by negotiating with stations and appearing before the
FCC?
The following pages present an analysis which I believe shows
that the public has rights to receive controversy and to gain access to
radio and television which are protected by the First Amendment.
The backbone of the argument consists of three recent Supreme
Court cases, The Red Lion case,' which affirmed the public right to
receive controversy, and the Button and Williams cases 7 which
protected the rights of groups to gain access to essential public
forums. Together, these cases support a First Amendment right of
groups to gain access to broadcasting, which is a modern and
essential forum. In addition, the public has substantial rights to
participate in FCC licensing and rule-making processes as recognized
in the United Church of Christ cases' and FCC pronouncements.
II. THE PUBLIC RIGHT To RECEIVE IDEAS By BROADCAST:
THE RED LION CASE
The nation is constitutionally committed to a policy of public
scrutiny and resolution of its controversies. As stated in the New
York Times case, the "debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide open . . . ."I There is excellent reason for the
commitment: without it the public will not grow with its times,
conflict will be concealed rather than resolved and injustice will be
redressed, if at all, by the use of violent rather than peaceful means.
A tight lid slapped on controversy, no matter who slaps it on, tends
toward explosion. On the other hand, effective public argument of
issues coupled with action can work to evolve a just public order
which meets the demands of the current times. We recognize that
6 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
7 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23
(1968).
8 See note 5, supra.
9 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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these are explosive times. Issues of war and peace, education, ethnic
justice, penal reform, and environmental protection require resolu-
tion. First Amendment freedoms should not be regarded simply as a
luxury reserved for some of the population, but as sources of power
which can change and advance the society. Justice Holmes expressed
his understanding of the utility of the First Amendment in his dissent
in Abrams v. United States:
Persecution for expression of opinion seems to me perfectly logical. If
you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain
result with all your heart you naturally express your wishes in law and
sweep away all opposition. To allow opposition by speech seems to
indicate that you think speech impotent, as when a man says that he
has squared the circle ..... But when men have realized that time
has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more
than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas .... 10
Holmes emphasized the usefulness of First Amendment freedoms.
However, if these freedoms are not available to the entire public,
they lose utility and become luxury items which are no longer
defensible.
It would be absurd if First Amendment freedoms did not find
protection in the most modern and most pervasive media, broad-
casting." The broadcasting media are regulated, and the capacity to
obtain a broadcast license is conditioned by the requirement that one
demonstrate service to the "public interest, convenience and neces-
sity." The general scheme of regulation has been approved by the
Supreme Court. 2 But the fact that the government may license the
operators of a medium does not mean that the public's rights to free
expression and to access are not a subject of constitutional protection
10 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
11 According to Mr. R.L. Bailey, ninety-five percent of American homes own
television receivers. JOURNAL OF BROADCASTING, Summer 1970, at 325. BROADCASTING
magazine recently reported that the estimated daily amount of television watching
in the nation in 1970 was 5.9 hours per day per household, a record high. BROAD-
CASTING, Jan. 18, 1971, at 35. BROADCASTING is a weekly magazine oriented toward
the broadcast industry, and apparently quite influential in the industry. It is a good
source of basic data and news concerning the industry. It is a different publication
from the JOURNAL OF BROADCASTING.
12 The grant of power to the FCC is contained in the Communications Act of
1934. See 47 U.S.C. § 309 (1962). The power to define the phrase, "public interest,
convenience and necessity" is vested generally in the FCC. The scheme has been
repeatedly approved in the Supreme Court. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190, 226-27 (1943); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, 386-89 (1969). FCC v. Pottsville, Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940),
Justice Frankfurter described the public interest, convenience and necessity criterion
as "a supple instrument for the exercise of discretion of the expert body," that is the
FCC. He stated that the criterion is as concrete as the complicated factors for judg-
ment in the field of communications permit.
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in that medium. It is precisely a government regulated, limited
communications medium which most requires the assurance that
freedom of speech not be destroyed.
Both Congress and the Supreme Court have recognized that
First Amendment freedoms apply to broadcasting.' 3 The Supreme
Court affirmation of the Amendment's application to broadcasting
occurred in 1969 in the Red Lion case. 4 Red Lion reaffirmed the
view that regulation of broadcasting was both justified and necessary,
because access to and use of airwaves is limited by mutual interfer-
ence and other technical factors. Without some regulation and with
"everybody on the air, nobody could be heard."'" Congressionally
authorized regulation is thus viewed as a part of the mix that makes
radio communication possible. Consequently, government regulation
of the industry can be viewed as creating a domain within which the
Amendment can operate.'
The Red Lion case'" arose from a verbal blast fired by Billy
James Hargis at journalist Fred J. Cook over radio station WGCB
in Red Lion, Pennsylvania in 1964. Cook was described in the broad-
cast as a man who was fired from his newspaper job for making up
and publicizing false charges against an official and who subsequently
went to work for a magazine which is "one of the most scurrilous
publications of the left which has championed many communist
causes over many years." 8 Shortly after the broadcast, Cook wrote
to the station and asked whether the remarks had in fact been made
and specifically requested reply time at the expense of WGCB.
The station dragged its feet commercially with letters indicating
that Cook might purchase reply time on the station. Cook then
complained to the FCC. The gist of the complaint was that the
station had made a personal attack upon Cook's "honesty, character,
13 "Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the Com-
mission the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted
by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed
by the Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of
radio communication." 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1962). Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367, 386-89 (1969).
14 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
15 National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 212 (1943).
16 Id. at 226. This was recognized in the opinion in the Nat. Broadcasting Co.
case. "But Congress did not authorize the Commission to choose among applicants
upon the basis of their political, economic or social views, or upon any other capri-
cious basis. If it did, or if the Commission by these Regulations proposed a choice
among applicants upon some such basis, the issue before us would be wholly dif-
ferent." Id.
17 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
18 Id. at 371. For the circuit court opinion see 381 F.2d 908, 910 (D.C. Cir.
1967).
1971]
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
integrity or like personal qualities."'" The station repeated its
demurrer that its communications to Cook were designed to ascertain
whether he was prepared to "sponsor" the broadcast. The FCC
responded to the station that the burden was upon the station to find
sponsorship for the reply. The FCC then required the station to
comply with its ruling that it provide Cook with free reply time.2"
WGCB appealed the ruling, thus commencing the first direct consti-
tutional attack on an element of the fairness doctrine of the FCC in
the Circuit Court in Washington, D.C. Somewhat later, in 1968, a
journalists' association, the Radio and Television News Directors'
Association, and eight radio and television companies commenced a
separate suit attacking substantially the same regulations.2 ' In Red
Lion the D.C. Circuit Court found the regulations constitutional
while in the RTNDA case, the Seventh Circuit found that the rules
were vague and imposed dangers of both FCC censorship and self-
censorship by licensees, and that hence they must fall under the First
Amendment, as the Commission had failed to show that it was not
able to obtain fairness by less oppressive means.
In the Red Lion and RTNDA cases, the circuit courts came
to opposite conclusions on the validity of the FCC personal attack
regulations, but each Court had decided that the First Amendment
applied to the matter and it must be decided with reference to the
Amendment.22 The losing party in each case sought review in the
Supreme Court, and the Court ruled on both cases in a single
consolidated opinion, popularly called the Red Lion case.2 a The
Supreme Court emphatically affirmed that the First Amendment
applied to the controversy. The Court stated that the First Amend-
ment "has a major role to play [in broadcasting] as the Congress
itself recognized in section 3 2 6 ... the people as a whole retain their
interest in free speech by radio and their collective right to have the
medium function consistently with the ends of the First Amend-
ment."12 4 Specifically the Court concluded that " the Congress and
the Commission do not violate the First Amendment when they
19 These regulations are now codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.123 (1970); identical
regulations applying to FM and television at 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.300, 73.598, 73.679
(1970).
20 381 F.2d 908, 910-17 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
21 Radio and Television News Directors Assn. v. United States, 400 F.2d 1002
(7th Cir. 1968).
22 Another contemporaneous decision of the D.C. Circuit concluded that the
First Amendment conditions FCC exercise of power. Anti-Defamation League of
B'Nai B'rith v. FCC, 403 F.2d 169, 171-72 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
23 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1968). The Court thus
affirmed the District of Columbia Decision in Red Lion.
24 Id. at 389.
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require a radio or television station to give reply time to answer
personal attacks or political editorials."2 5
During the course of the litigation, the two circuit courts and
the Supreme Court dealt with two subjects which will affect decisions
in future cases: burdens on broadcasters and the public's right to
receive.
Burdens on Broadcasters
The broadcasters in RTNDA had urged that the personal
attack rules were burdensome. The broadcaster's itemization of the
burden was impressive: The regulations require the broadcaster to
notify persons or groups within a week that they have been attacked,
to provide them with a tape or script, and to offer an opportunity to
respond over the air. Complying with these requirements can involve
a hefty amount of overseeing and work. The broadcaster must
decide whether the attack is one covered by these reply rights or one
excluded because it was part of an on-the-spot newscast or excluded
for some other reason.2" If the right to respond is demanded by the
person attacked, the station is then faced with providing the reply
time, perhaps at its expense, and with rescheduling requirements
which will alter its programming. After reviewing the burdens
imposed, the Seventh Circuit in RTNDA concluded that they were
heavy and likely to inhibit a broadcast licensee's dissemination of
views on public issues. The upshot might be a self imposed censorship
by the licensee resulting in "a blandness and neutrality pervading all
broadcasts arguably within the scope of the rules."2 "
At the Circuit Court in the Red Lion case, the petitioners had
characterized the burdens together with FCC enforcement through
the licensing process as a prior restraint on their broadcasts on
public issues. FCC licensing power weighs heavily, they said, forcing
25 Id. at 396.
26 The reply regulations reviewed in the RTNDA case provided that: "When,
during the presentation of views on a controversial issue of public importance,
an attack is made upon the honesty, character, integrity or like personal qualities of
an identified person or group, the licensee shall, with a reasonable time and in no
event later than 1 week after the attack, transmit to the person or group attacked(1) notification of the date, time and identification of the broadcast; (2) a script
or tape (or an accurate summary if a script or tape is not available) of the attack;
(3) an offer of a reasonable opportunity to respond over the licensee's facilities."
The regulations provide that the notification, script and reply time requirements
listed above do not apply to attacks on foreign figures or groups, attacks made by
legally qualified candidates or their representatives or to "bona fide newscasts, bona
fide news interviews and on-the-spot coverage of a bona fide news event." 47 CFR
73.123.
27 RTNDA, 400 F.2d at 1014.
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broadcasters to assume an unlawful burden of becoming the "first
censor" of broadcasts, especially controversial ones. The Circuit
Court rejected the contention, finding that the broadcasters retained
a complete latitude of program selection and design "bounded only
by their own determination of the public interest appeal of their end
product."28 The fairness doctrine and its component personal attack
rules are part of the appropriate trusteeship of the broadcaster to
serve the First Amendment objective of informing the electorate.
The Supreme Court did not reject the idea that burdens were
imposed on the licensees' actual broadcasting, but held that the
burdens were justifed by the First Amendment itself. The Court
reviewed the history of radio regulation, reaffirming the view that
the cacaphony of voices in broadcasting prior to 1927 made regula-
tion necessary, and stating that regulation in fact made com-
munication by radio possible. Relating this need to the First
Amendment, the Court stated that it would be strange if the Amend-
ment, "aimed at protecting and furthering communications, pre-
vented the Government from making radio communication possible
by requiring licenses .... ,,2 By obtaining a license the broadcaster
does not obtain a constitutionally protected right to monopolize the
media and prevent its use by other citizens. On the contrary, the very
function of the First Amendment demands that this vast means of
communication not be subject to the domination of a few. The Court
concluded that "the people as a whole retain their interest in free
speech by radio and their collective right to have the medium func-
tion consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment.
It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the
broadcasters which is paramount.13 0 Thus the Court determined that
the burdens protected First Amendment rights rather than fettering
them.
The Supreme Court noted the possibility that stations might
respond to the reply time requirements by eliminating or modifying
the controversial coverages that might trigger the reply obligations.
In this manner they could eliminate burdens upon themselves at the
expense of the public which would receive bland or vapid viewing.
The Court apparently accepted the FCC assessment that this pro-
spect was speculative. Furthermore, the Court noted that the term
"public interest" clearly encompasses "vigorous debate of contro-
versial issues of public importance."'" The Court was not obliged to
give a definite answer to what the Commission could do about
28 Red Lion, 381 F.2d at 929.
29 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389.
80 Id. at 390.
81 Id. at 385.
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intentional program blandness, for the issue was not directly before
it. However, it commented that the Commission has power to insist
on fair coverage of controversy if that became necessary. 2
The Court was not in a position to give definitive responses to
the blandness problem in Red Lion. The problem is an important
one, though. Many people insist that coverage of both controversial
and commonplace events is shallow and misleading because it is not
subject to the fire of the actual debates that exist in the community.
Some find that the problem goes beyond blandness and into the area
of conscious creation of public attitudes [and hence public policies
and rules] by management of who and what is seen and at what
time. Selection, of course, is the essence of editing. It is also, un-
fortunately, a definitive element of tyranny. Whether there is
tyranny or honest editing in broadcasting depends really upon
whether there are de facto conditions of free speech and press.
A number of criticisms and justifications of current broadcasting
are available in professional journals, trade magazines and the
popular press. One criticism was made by Robert MacNeil in
Harper's Magazine for October 1968.11 Mr. MacNeil stated that
news is used as a commodity to attract audiences and that the public
information and decision making value of news is fully subordinated
to the goal of making it shallow entertainment. He quotes Walter D.
Scott, chairman of the board for NBC, who explains that "Because
television is a visual medium, it may scan the background and
significance of events to focus on the outward appearance-the
comings and goings of statesmen instead of the issue that confronts
them."34 Mr. MacNeil states that the devitalizing of news and events
32 Id. at 385, 392-94. For a comment on this portion of the opinion, see Com-
ment, From the FCC's Fairness Doctrine to Red Lion's Fiduciary Principle, 5 HAsv.
Civ. RicHTs-CIv. LiB. L. REv. 89, 95-7 (1970).
33 HARPER'S, Oct. 1968, at 72. Another criticism appears in TN. GUIDE, Jan. 30,
1971, at 6, which surveys the observations of students and college administrators to
television coverage of events on their campuses. In the article Leigh Steinberg,
former president of the student body at Berkeley is quoted: "Television is using the
University of California to sell commercials because people enjoy watching students
getting their heads beaten in. It completely ignores the positive, constructive aspects
of the campus peace movement. For example, we have nonviolent student groups
working for constructive social change, but we can't beg, borrow or steal TV time for
them. TV isn't interested in that. They'll be out here for the confrontations,
though . . . .The basic issues are not being elucidated by television. It is missing
everything but the action. Since there's no coverage of the previolence issues, a
demonstration is sprung on the viewers as a surprise and they think it is a sudden
lark. They miss the step-by-step efforts to avoid a confrontation." Since this type
of reporting of events generally discredits the students it reaffirms and supports the
status quo. Neil Hickey, the author of the article, states that according to his work,
Mr. Steinberg's statements accurately reflects the sentiments of many other campus
leaders.
34 HARPER'S, Oct. 1968, at 72.
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is accomplished by editing, programming, the "star system" of
selecting commentators who do not gather the news themselves and
by stylizing of the mode of delivery-"Half sung, half chanted...
[which] makes most of the stories sound alike and imparts a certain
artificiality to the content." In conclusion he states:
It is difficult to believe that it is the fear of government regulation which
keeps broadcasting so sterile of opinion. Government regulation by FCC
does not appear to be nearly so effective in bringing broadcasters to
heel as the occasional direct interference of an elected official or the
general awareness of being part of a business community with a large
stake in the economy.85
Mr. MacNeil brings to the forefront the commercial and big
business controls which operate in the television industry. While
apparent control of broadcasting is lodged in the limited number of
stations which obtain a license from the FCC, a great measure of
control is lodged with other economic interests, especially the three
big networks and the advertisers. The Supreme Court in Red Lion
did not alter the basic organization and control of broadcasting, but
it did note that the First Amendment does not confer on licensees or
networks unfettered power to monopolize a scarce resource such as
broadcasting.
There is no sanctuary in the First Amendment for unlimited private
censorship operating in a medium not open to all. 'Freedom of the
press from governmental interference under the First Amendment does
not sanction repression of that freedom by private interests.' 8 6
While the Court has assured that the Amendment does not sanction
monopoly, the obligation to act for change falls upon the viewing and
listening community. If the community finds that the networks and
stations are producing a predominance of bland programming,
or exciting but pointless programming, it must act to fashion handy
and practical ways of using legal institutions for change.
The Right to Receive
The fulcrum of the Supreme Court's ruling was First Amend-
ment protection of the public's right to receive. It was this primary
constitutional consideration that justified the burdens on broad-
casters discussed above. The Court stated:
Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government is
permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views
should be expressed on this unique medium. But the people as a whole
retain their interest in free speech by radio and their collective right
8 Id. at 80.
86 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. at 392.
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to have the medium function consistently with the ends of the First
Amendment. It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right
of the broadcasters, which is paramount . . . It is the right of the
public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral,
and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here. The right may
not constitutionally be abridged either by Congress or by the FCC.
7
The broadcasters can be forced to yield a portion of their time so
that the public can be informed on more than one view of a public
controversy or a personal attack.
The public right to receive, which the Court expressed, is based
on the idea that the public can intelligently decide on issues that
confront it. An attack on Fred Cook or on Billy James Hargis also
attacks ideas which the men represent. People tend to accept or
reject ideas as much because of who expresses them as what the
ideas mean. For example, a public may form its collective attitude on
whether a piece of land shall be used as a park or a parking lot,
dependent on its perception of whether the proponents of a park are
"hippies" or "street people" and their perception of the meaning of
these terms."8 I think it is pretty clear to most of us that terms such
as these have acquired meanings to the public and that the meanings
are principally made up of impressions, ideology and connotation
rather than careful examination of the facts. The mass media create
the impressions of personalities that shape public policies. The effect
of the personal images purveyed is felt in public decisions on the
Vietnam war, on issues of justice for ethnic groups, on the position of
women in society and really on issues across the board.
In the Abrams case, Justice Holmes expressed the idea that the
First Amendment established a mechanism that allowed ideas to
compete for acceptance.8" Hopefully, truth or better ideas will
achieve acceptance, but there is no guarantee of that. However, if
the markets of ideas, like broadcasting, are open, then those which
are persuasive to the people will influence the development of the
society. To judge ideas and actions, the entire public needs to be
able to receive a full variety of information about people and issues.
To be full, the coverage must include spontaneous comments,
advocacy from different points of view and the opportunity to see
and hear people who are directly involved. The need for this depth
and spontaneity of information is reflected in what Robert MacNeil
called one of the standard rules of journalism-that the circum-
stances and promoter of an interview be disclosed in order that the
37 Id. at 390.
88 NawswExK, May 26, 1969, at 39.
39 See note 10, supra and accompanying text.
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audience be able to evaluate what has been said.4" All parts of the
public need the chance to compare views and facts on what a
"hippie" is, or who Fred Cook or Ron Dellums or Spiro Agnew is.
The information gives a basis of intelligent choice and intelligent
action. Politically the First Amendment is nothing if it does not
promote intelligent action on public issues.
Public communication in this century presents a puzzle. There
is more information available through more media than ever before,
but public exchange of essential information is superficial. The
superficial coverage is due to the combined effect of many factors
which include government secrecy, insincere political speech making,
silly advertising campaigns and the sheer impact of vast amounts of
information being available. In order to have communication which
approaches Holmes' marketplace expectations, we must be able to
receive a wide range of live controversy, including the uncensored
emotions and arguments of people who are involved in all aspects of
our social order. That is the vigorous communication which we have
the right to receive.
III. LET'S Go ON TV: COMMUNITY POLITICS AND ExPRESSION
The First Amendment protects the right of free expression.
Linked to that is a public right to receive the fruits of free expression.
In a limited access medium like TV, the two rights are held closely
together. The right to receive must be strengthened without having
the receiving public dictate what is broadcast. Program dictatorship
by the receiving public would allow majorities and substantial
minorities to keep the small minorities, the unpopular and the novel
silent. The viewer may act to repress, which is exactly what the First
Amendment must guard against. The need for protection from
audience repression is stated by Professor Emerson:
The starting point is a recognition of the powerful forces that impel
men toward the elimination of unorthodox expression. Most men have
a strong inclination to suppress opposition even where differences in
viewpoint are comparatively slight. But a system of free expression
must be framed to withstand far greater stress. The test of any such
system is not whether it tolerates minor deviations but whether it
permits criticism of the fundamental beliefs and practices of the society.
And in this area the drives to repress, both irrational and rational,
tend to become overwhelming. 41
The public right to receive controversy can be preserved and
the threat of audience repression avoided if the right to receive is
40 See note 34, supra.
41 T. EMERSON, TOwARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FrRST AMENDMENT 16
(1967).
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protected by assuring that the variety of views present in the com-
munity have an opportunity to get on radio and television. That is,
the public right to receive is protected by a public right of access.
The individual who does not want to listen may turn off his set, rather
than turn off the broadcast which others may wish to hear.
4 2
Getting on TV is a part of the practical politics of America. The
constitutional foundation of this activity is apparent in two of the
outstanding First Amendment cases of the past ten years. One of
these cases is Williams v. Rhodes.4" In Williams the Supreme Court
ruled that the ballot qualification rule of Ohio was invalid. The effect
of the law had been to make it virtually impossible for a new political
party, even though it had hundreds of thousands of new members, or
an old party with a small number of members to get on the state
ballot. Justice Black, who wrote for the Court, stated that the ballot
requirements were burdening two closely associated constitutional
rights, the right to associate to advance political beliefs protected by
the First Amendment and the right to cast votes effectively, pro-
tected by Article I, Section 2." The Court ruled that a state could
place unequal burdens on political parties only upon a showing of
compelling state interest, which had not been shown. If a party is to
gather momentum commensurate with its actual or potential appeal
it must have the opportunity to compete effectively in ideas and in
organization. Protection of the right to get a ballot position is
essential, of course. But even that is ineffective if the voters can
only say "Who are they?" once in the voting booth.
The second case that relates here is a truly exciting case on the
use of institutions to make social change. This is NAACP v. Button,4
which protected a First Amendment right to use attorneys and
litigation to obtain social equality.
... [I]n the context of NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique
of resolving private differences; it is a means for achieving the lawful
objectives of equality of treatment by all government, federal, state
42 The viewer's protection of his privacy is not to allow him to insist that no
message be delivered, as Congress has recently provided with respect to "erotically
arousing or sexually provocative mail." See 39 U.S.C. §§ 4000-08 (1962) and Rowan
v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 90 S. Ct. 1484 (1970). With
respect to mail, it is possible to stop delivery to yourself without stopping delivery
to others. However, if a broadcast is shut off because someone or some group does
not want to hear, then no one is permitted to hear.
43 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
44 The Court cited Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) for the proposition.
On the issue of the effective vote, it should also be noted that the Supreme Court
has recognized and protected a premise implicit in equal protection of the law, that
equal protection depends upon equal voice in creation of law and that this voice can
not be denied by financial requirements or any other means. Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964); Harper v. Virginia Board, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
45 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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and local, for the members of the Negro community in this country.
It is thus a form of political expression. Groups which find themselves
unable to achieve their objectives through the ballot frequently turn
to the courts. Just as it was true of the opponents of New Deal legis-
lation during the 1930's, for example, no less is it true of the Negro
minority today. And under conditions of modern government, litigation
may well be the sole practicable avenue open to a minority to petition
for redress of grievances. 46
That statement really takes the First Amendment out into the
world of actual social conflict. Lawyers are accustomed to the use
of courts to challenge existing ideas. We see the process in action
frequently: A rule or practice exists. It has its foundation in long
administrative or judicial acceptance, and then, as if by surprise a
reexamination of the rule is forced by litigants. The rule may then
be found lacking in reason, in contradiction to fundamental prin-
ciples of the law or out of touch with current reality, and it goes by
the board. 7 The court is a forum for legal change where minority
representation is entitled to be heard. Broadcasting is another
forum, one which is perfectly suited to using the electoral process,
acknowledged as essential in Williams. If broadcasting can be-
come effective in making the ballot more meaningful, then the last
resort to court can be avoided, consistent with the Constitution and
democratic theory.
The Williams and Button cases each protected First Amend-
ment action by assuring a group's access to a forum. If part of the
community wants to get into the broadcasting forum, there is a
First Amendment interest as surely as when it seeks position in
court or on the ballot. If anything, the First Amendment aspect may
be stronger than it was in either of those two cases, for radio and
television are purely communications media. Assuring groups some
means of getting on television also provides the community at large
with information on the controversies in the community without
running the risk of censorship based on majority values.
Refusing a group the right to get on radio and television
oftentimes will encourage them to do something unusual or illegal
to bring public attention to what they need to say. That happens
usually when the issue is important enough in the eyes of the gen-
eral membership of the group to justify demonstration or militancy.
If the demonstration is "newsy" enough for the media, or will draw
46 Id. at 429.
47 It is interesting to pause and look back at the process. See Winterbottom v.
Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842); MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d
57, 377 P.2d 897 (1962); Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561 (1968).
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audiences and hence sell cars or soap, then the TV cameras may
come on the scene and catch the action. A friend who had been
active in civil rights work described an example which he had seen.
About five years ago it was possible to bring television attention to
civil rights issues by picketing. However, when picketing became
"old hat," the television cameras did not show up. On the occasion
which my friend spoke of, the civil rights group began picketing a
hotel. The picketing progressed for a while, drawing local attention
but no newsmen, although the civil rights group felt that the issue
was definitely important enough to enter the popular public media.
One leader adopted the simple expedient of having the picketers
block an adjacent driveway with their line. This brought "about
ten newsmen and fifty police" within a short time, and thus the
protest became news. Today it may take more unusual conduct or
maybe even a bloody fight with the police to draw attention to
points of view in this way.4" A regularized form of access to tele-
vision could diminish this particular inducement to demonstration
or confrontation.
Granting groups access to effective places to speak is an
essential aspect of the First Amendment. If a person can not use
the means of communication which reach the public, he can not
hope to persuade people to his ideas. Consequently, free speech is
as effectively denied by denying access as it is by applying criminal
penalties to the content of speech. In recognition of these essentials
of free speech, the public right to make use of strategic places for
speech and protest has been assured in a variety of situations. Pri-
vately owned property held open for business has been held subject
to public use for peaceful picketing and political activity.49 Public
streets and parks and other places have been protected as natural
focal points of public discussion, debate and demonstration."
Broadcasting media are really nothing other than modern analogs
to such public places. 51 Consequently, reasonable access to these
48 T.V. GumE, Jan. 30, 1970, at 6.
49 Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308
(1968); Diamond v. Bland, 3 Cal. 3d 653, 91 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1970).
50 See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) and regarding limitations
on these rights, see Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966). Concerning the use of
public places such as streets the reader may wish to read: H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND
T=E FIRST AMENDMENT 183-214 (1965).
51 Access to media other than television has had its ups and downs. In California
the Women for Peace obtained an injunction supporting their right to have an anti-
Vietnam war sign posted in the advertising section of the local transit district buses.
The injunction was affirmed by the California Supreme Court. Wirta v. Alameda-
Contra Costa Transit District, 68 Cal. 2d 51, 434 P.2d 982 (1967). However, recently,
a union was denied injunctive relief by a Federal District Court in Illinois when
the union sought to compel access to the Chicago Tribune and other newspapers for
its advertisement explaining strike action. The court stated that in its view a rule
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media for groups must be protected if the First Amendment is to
function to protect an open market place in modern terms. The
Supreme Court in Red Lion recognized the validity of requiring a
licensee to share its powerful communications resource, because if
this were not done, other representative voices of the community
would by necessity "be barred from the airwaves." The Court is
committed fully to the concept that effective opportunities of com-
munication must be assured.
IV. ACCESS AND THE FCC
Discussion of rights to get on television will become misleading
if we do not look at the power of the Federal Communications Com-
mission at this point. The FCC has been granted rather complete
power to license radio and television as it determines what the public
interest, convenience and necessity require. In deciding whether to
license a station, the FCC is impelled into evaluation of program-
ming-broadcasting is programming, and you can not check out the
one without checking out the other. The FCC is therefore under
somewhat conflicting commands. It must determine how valuable
programming is, yet it must neither censor nor abridge free speech
in other ways.52 Because of its primary jurisdiction of licensing,
the FCC will be the principal forum for defining the application
and remedies of the First Amendment in broadcasting. The First
Amendment is part of the public interest which governs licensing,
and thus free speech ideas will tend to become suffused in that
term. The tendency is illustrated in the Supreme Court's opinion
in Red Lion: ". . . the 'public interest' in broadcasting clearly en-
compasses the presentation of vigorous debate of controversial
issues of importance and concern to the public . . . ."" The fact
that free speech is obviously part of the public interest should not
be allowed to dilute its constitutional preeminence.
In 1960 the Commission examined its role as an evaluator of
programming. It concluded:
assuring a right of access to newspapers simply does not exist and commented that
"if, in many respects, private censorship is no better than public censorship, the fact
remains that the right to free speech was never intended to include the right to use
the other fellow's presses . . . ." Chicago Joint Board, Amalgamated Clothing Workers
of America v. Chicago Tribune Company, 307 F. Supp. 422 (N.D. Ill. 1969). The
Wirta and Logan Valley Plaza cases (See note 49, supra) are correct in stating a rule
of First Amendment derivation that protects access. Whatever genuine differences
should exist with respect to its application to the press, which also enjoys First
Amendment protection, the principle of access should include the press. The press is
not superior to the public, but is one of the First Amendment means guaranteed to
the people. In rejecting this point, the District Court was wrong. See Associated Press
v. United States, 362 U.S. 1 at 20 (1944).
52 See notes 2-12 supra, and accompanying text.
53 See note 31, supra.
[Vol. I11
RADIO, T.V. AND THE COMMUNITY
Although the Commission must determine whether the total program
service of broadcasters is reasonably responsive to the interests and
needs of the public they serve, it may not condition the grant, denial
or revocation of a broadcast license upon its own subjective deter-
mination of what is or is not a good program. To do so would be to
'lay a forbidden burden upon the exercise of liberty protected by the
Constitution.' 54
The Commission noted that the needs of the public vary from com-
munity to community and that it was the obligation of the licensee
to determine the needs of his community and take reasonable steps
to meet them. The Commission listed the following needs as gener-
ally included in the interests of most communities:
1. Opportunity for Local Self Expression
2. The Development and Use of Local Talent
3. Programs for Children
4. Religious Programs
5. Educational Programs
6. Public Affairs Programs
7. Editorialization by Licensees
8. Political Broadcasts
9. Agricultural Programs
10. News Programs
11. Weather and Market Reports
12. Sports Programs
13. Service to Minority Groups
14. Entertainment Programming"s
The issues of service to the community come to a point of de-
cision when the Commission passes on the license itself, in either
an initial license or a renewal proceeding. No license is permanent,
but is limited to a maximum three year term.5" In evaluation of the
application for a license, the Commission evaluates proposed and
past performances, if any, together with economic capacity to serve.
The latter point includes the question of whether the area will sup-
port competition and has been explained by the District of Colum-
bia Circuit Court as follows:
[I]t seems to us, the question whether a station makes $5,000, or
$10,000, or $50,000 is a matter in which the public has no interest so
long as service is not adversely affected; service may well be improved
by competition. But, if the situation in a given area is such that avail-
able revenue will not support good service in more than one station,
54 FCC 60-970, Report and Statement of Policy re: Commission en bane Pro-
gramming Inquiry, July 29 (1960) 25 F.R. 7291. This statement and many other
basic legal materials such as the statutes and leading FCC and court cases have been
reproduced in a paperback book: F. KAHmN, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN BROADCASTING
207-23 (F. Kahn ed. 1968). See also proposed rule regarding license renewals, P & F
Radio Reg. 53:339 (1971).
55 F. KAHN, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN BROADCASTING at 219.
56 47 U.S.C. § 307 (1962).
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the public interest may well be in the licensing of one rather than two
stations.5 7
Where there is more than one applicant for a license, the Commis-
sion evaluates the prospective licensees comparatively. In 1965 the
Commission outlined its guiding concepts in comparative licensing
and laid primary emphasis on program service and diversification
of control of the media. The Commission stated:
We believe that there are two primary objectives toward which the
process of comparison should be directed. They are, first, the best
practicable service to the public, and second, a maximum diffusion of
control of the media of mass communications. The value of these ob-
jectives is clear. Diversification of control is a public good in a free
society, and is additionally desirable where a government licensing
system limits access by the public to the use of radio and television
facilities. Equally basic is a broadcast service which meets the needs of
the public in the area to be served .... 58
A renewal applicant comes to the competitive proceeding with the
advantage over other applicants. He will "be preferred over the
newcomer and his application for renewal will be granted," 59 if he
shows that his past service has been substantially attuned to his
community and there have not been serious deficiencies in his ser-
vice. The Commission has granted this competitive advantage be-
cause it believes that a contrary policy might discourage the solid
investment necessary for good service and encourage opportunism
and short run profit taking. Commissioner Nicholas Johnson dis-
sented from the grant of a preferred position to renewals, emphasiz-
ing the public's need for protection of the open, competitive market
place in ideas in which each applicant has equal chance and an
existing licensee would be completely open to the "risk that a com-
peting applicant would offer a service preferable in some way, and
thereby win the license away. ' '6
°
The Commission, then, will be the initial focal point of creat-
ing specific protections of First Amendment rights. Its power is
"not niggardly but expansive," and generally it can not be by-
passed.61The particular rights of access to radio and television will
57 Carroll Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1958). The
question of debilitating injury due to competition is called the "Carroll issue" after
this case. See also Southwestern Operating Co. v. FCC, 351 F.2d 834 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Missouri-Illinois Broadcasting Co., 3 P. & F. Radio Reg. 2d 232 (1964).
58 FCC 65-689, Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, July 28
(1965).
59 FCC 70-62, 40869, Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings
2, (Jan. 15, 1970).
60 Id. at 1.
61 NBC v. FCC, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). The Red Lion case was also an affirmance
of FCC power to regulate. In Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 559 (1970), the Red Lion
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be subject to a lot of modelling by the FCC. Great weight will be
given to FCC solutions of the problems of public interest and free
speech access. However, the citizen or group who goes to the FCC
with a claim of a right to get on television can prevail on the FCC
with the authority of court decisions on free speech rights. The
FCC is the administrative "expert" on the allocation and super-
vision of air waves, but the Court is the expert and final arbiter of
constitutional claims.62
I have argued in favor of the people's right to get on television
in the previous section. Access is a First Amendment right, accord-
ing to those observations. In placing claims to that First Amend-
ment right before the FCC, it is necessary to recognize that there
are other First Amendment interests which the FCC can properly
consider in deciding whether a group has a particular right to get on
television. Some of these are the general community right to receive
news, controversy, educational, cultural and entertainment pro-
grams; the interest of the station in producing a creative program;
and the station's freedom to broadcast without being controlled as
to content.
The Station's Interest in Producing a Creative Overall Program
The station certainly has a recognizable interest in going ahead
and producing an overall creative program. That interest is ac-
case is cited for the proposition that due deference should be accorded to the agency
charged with administration of a congressional enactment. In United States v. South-
western Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968), the Court affirmed FCC regulation of cable
television and reaffirmed the broad authority of the Commission to regulate develop-
ments in the dynamic and fluctuating broadcast industry. See also Gordon v. Nat.
Broadcasting Co., 287 F. Supp. 452 (S.D. N.Y. 1968); Ackerman v. Columbia Broad-
casting System, 301 F. Supp. 628 (S.D. N.Y. 1969), declining causes of action on
television rights because of the primary jurisdiction of the FCC. For a discussion of
"primary jurisdiction," see L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIvE ACTION
121-25 (1965).
62 The FCC has recently considered several cases in which parties requested
access to broadcasting. In one of these cases the Commission refused to take action
against a station that had declined to carry the complaining party's spot announce-
ments urging immediate withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam. The Com-
mission disposed of the complaint on the basis that there was no showing that the
station had failed to afford reasonable opportunity for presentation of contrasting
viewpoints on the issue of American involvement in Vietnam. In re Business Execu-
tives Move For Vietnam Peace, 25 F.C.C. 2d 242 (1970). See also In re Democratic
National Committee, 25 F.C.C. 2d 216 (1970) and Letter to Mrs. Madalyn Murray,
40 F.C.C. 647 (1965). These cases indicate that the FCC may be satisfied that First
Amendment rights are adequately protected when the broadcaster has allowed airing
of views that contrast with those which the broadcaster has selected. This position is
based on the notion that the fairness doctrine is a complete protection for First
Amendment rights. It is not a sufficient protection if station management declines to
air new issues or air the views of substantial groups of citizens in the first place. In
my opinion, FCC doctrine will have to be modified on this point because the First
Amendment guarantees access. See parts II and III, and notes 31 and 32, supra.
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knowledged by the Communications Act criteria of public interest,
and by the FCC and Court recognition that the licensee has to use
his public trust effectively. The public would be hurt badly if the
stations and their people could not develop a program. It would be
similar to the community loss if schools were not able to develop
along certain lines, or if a theater or dance troupe or sports orga-
nization were denied development. However, noting the size and
strength of the broadcast industry, it is more than likely that this
particular interest has received great consideration in the past,
especially with respect to the big stations. The overall Commission
view affirms the idea that programming responsibility lies with the
station. The policy is probably sound, so long as community groups
who want to get a license or participate in station control have a
real and equal chance to do this.
The Station's Freedom to Broadcast without Control of Individual
Program Content
At times the Commission has adhered to a fairly firm position
that the station has the right to broadcast specific programs with-
out fearing FCC sanction. For example, in March 1969 in the Dan
Sanders case6" the Commission affirmed the right of a station to
broadcast poetry and a discussion which laid bare the raw anger
which some Black people feel toward Jews. The particular program
was broadcast in New York City, which has a large population of
both Jewish and Black people. It commenced with a reading of
some poems, including the following one:
ANTI-SEMITISM
Hey, Jew boy, with that yamulka on your head
You pale faced Jew boy-I wish you were dead
I can see you Jew boy-no you can't hide
I got a scoop on you-yeh, you gonna die
I'm sick of your stuff
Every time I turn 'round-your pushin' my head deeper into the ground
I'm sick of hearing about your suffering in Germany
I'm sick about your escape from tyranny
I'm sick of seeing in everything I do
About the murder of 6 million Jews
Hitler's reign lasted for only 15 years
For that period of time you shed crocodile tears
My suffering lasted over 400 years, Jew boy
And the white man only let me play with his toys
Jew boy, you took my religion and adopted it for you
But you know that black people were the original Hebrews
63 In re Complaint of United Federation of Teachers, 17 F.C.C. 2d 204 (1969)
[referred to as the Dan Sanders case].
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When the U.N. made Israel a free independent State
Little 4- and 5-year-old boys threw handgrenades
They hated the black Arabs with all their might
And you, Jew boy, said it was all right
Then you came to America, land of the free
And took over the school system to perpetrate white supremacy
Guess you know, Jew boy, there's only one reason you made it
You had a clean white face, colorless, and faded
I hated you Jew boy, because your hangup was the Torah
And my only hangup was my color.
On a subsequent program, approximately a month later, a group of
Black guests discussed black reaction to the poem, "Anti-Semitism."
Apparently the group agreed that many Blacks support or identify
with the feelings expressed in the poem, but disagreed among them-
selves as to how prevalent these feelings are in the Black com-
munity. In stating its position that making this broadcast was a
matter for licensee judgment, the Commission adhered to the views
expressed by the Supreme Court in Carroll v. Princess Anne 4 and
the Cantwell case65 that inflamatory speech which is not protected
by the Constitution is a very narrow class in which the speech is a
kind of pure invitation to fighting and violence. 6 The Commission
held that the licensee must evaluate the broadcasts to see whether
"its approach skirts too closely to the burgeoning violence situa-
tion." 7 The Commission opinion noted the station's contention that
there was positive value to such a discussion which might illuminate
a dangerous kind of bigotry and by discussion tend to eradicate it.
There was thus an element of utility coupled to the hateful tone of
the poem, but the Commission did not appear to be requiring such
an element as a condition of protecting the program. "If there is
to be free speech, it must be free for speech that we abhor and hate
as well as for speech that we find tolerable or congenial."6
In another case, the Pacifica case,69 which arose several years
prior to the Dan Sanders case, the Commission upheld the right of
a station to broadcast programs which might offend certain listeners,
but the tenor of the decision was founded more upon the conditional
proposition that the station's overall programming judgments had
been related to the public interest, than upon the straightforward
First Amendment approach of Sanders. One of the programs which
64 Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
65 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
66 See notes 64-5, supra.
67 See note 63, supra.
68 In re Complaint of Anti-Defamation League of B'Nai B'rith, 4 F.C.C. 2d
190, 192 (1966). The Commission's position of non-interference with upsetting broad-
casts expressed in that case was affirmed on appeal. Anti-Defamation League v.
F.C.C., 403 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1968).69 In re Pacifica Foundation, 36 F.C.C. 147, P. & F. Radio Reg. 747 (1964).
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had been complained of was a discussion by homosexuals about their
attitudes and problems. One Commissioner filed a concurring state-
ment due to his concern over this program. He intimated a view that
individual programs which might be considered in themselves a
violation of good taste or not in the public interest might be grounds
for non-renewal of a license. His view was that responsible broad-
casters should discuss homosexuality by way of doctor's and sociolo-
gist's remarks, but not by way of the comments of homosexuals
themselves. He likened the broadcast to gathering similar informa-
tion on prostitution by placing a "microphone in a bordello" and
concluded that such programming has little place on the air.
Just two years before the Pacifica case, a Commission decision,
popularly referred to as the Charlie Walker case,"0 had left free ex-
pression in programs in an extremely weak position. It seems that
Charlie, a disc jockey, was given to telling earthy jokes about the
guys and the gals and greeting his listeners in rural, southeastern
South Carolina with a hearty, this is "Uncle Banana Nose, lettin'
it all hang out . . . ." The hearing examiner in a lengthy opinion
concluded that the jokes or commentary were "obscene and inde-
cent and, a fortiori, coarse, vulgar, suggestive, and susceptible of
indecent double meaning." Because of the lack of decency in the
programs, the examiner concluded that the station owner had been
woefully inadequate in discharging his responsibilities and found the
broadcasting to be a ground for denying renewal. The Commission
accepted the examiner's decision and concluded that a substantial
portion of the broadcast time had contained material which was
"flagrantly and patently offensive in the context of the broadcast
field ... and thus contrary to the public interest." In other words,
vulgar and suggestive stuff, or at least too much of it was not per-
missible on the air.
I have come away from my reading of the Charlie Walker case
with the impression that Washington D.C. was imposing its taste
on rural South Carolina. The Commission attempted to cover that
type of objection in its opinion by saying that it was not Commission
good taste which was imposed, but that there was merely rejection
of the flagrantly offensive by any standard. The Commission relied
on the requirement that the station serve the public interest and
found that this one did not. But the fact that the Commission could
rest its ruling on the term public interest does not cure the free
speech objection that a license apparently may be denied because
of offensive programming, even though other elements of public
service may exist.
70 In re Palmetto, 33 F.C.C. 250 (1962).
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The Charlie Walker result appears to me to be fully incon-
sistent with the Commission's decision in Dan Sanders. In the
earlier Walker case the Commission was willing to deny access to
"offensive" programming, while in the Sanders case it acknowl-
edged that free speech applies in broadcasting and that necessarily
freedom must include the offensive as well as the inoffensive. 71 The
Sanders case may also indicate that the FCC is becoming more
critically aware of its function in developing effective free speech
through the broadcast media.
The FCC is the crucial forum for establishing rights to access
in broadcasting. The Commission has had to deal with free speech
issues in the past, and in the area of the fairness doctrine and the
personal attack rules it has dealt specifically with access rights. In
approaching the FCC on issues of access, claimants need to em-
phasize that access to the broadcast media is a fundamental neces-
sity of democratic practice and of effective modern speech. The
FCC is charged with assuring that the public interest is served by
the licensed media. The broadcast media are purely communications
media, therefore creation of the basis of effective free spech is the
most essential task of the Commission. Group rights to access can
be established which are completely consistent with the licensee's
First Amendment interests of free expression in individual programs
and freedom to develop a creative overall programming.
V. STATIONS FOR THE COMMUNITY
I would like to return now to the two United Church of Christ
cases. Recall that the operation of the Jackson radio station
WLBT, appeared to have denied Black groups and others the right
71 The Commission has not taken a clear position on the stations' liberty to
broadcast what may be regarded as "offensive" speech. For example, recently, while
reaffirming the need for robust debate, it ruled that certain phrases are nevertheless
out of bounds. It imposed a 100 dollar forfeiture upon a station for broadcasting a
wide ranging interview with Jerry Garcia of "The Grateful Dead" in which Garcia
used the words "fucking" and "shit" to describe his observations about life. The
Commission concluded: "Simply stated, our position-limited to the facts of this
case-is that [wide open] debate does not require that persons being interviewed
or station employees on talk shows have the right to begin their speech with 'Shit
man . . .' or use 'fucking' or 'mother fucking' as gratuitous adjectives throughout
their speech. This fosters no debate, serves no social purpose, and would drastically
curtail the usefulness of radio for millions of people." Eastern Education Radio, 18
P. & F. Radio Reg. 2d 860, 868 (1970). Commissioner Johnson dissented, observing
that the Commission had condemned not words so much as it condemned a culture
which uses such words.
See also the FCC public notice enjoining stations to review lyrics of songs before
broadcasting them because of the "current and pressing concern: the use of language
tending to promote or glorify the use of illegal drugs as marijuana, LSD, 'speed', etc."
21 P. & F. Radio Reg. 2d 1576 (1971).
See Note, Offensive Speech and the FCC, 79 YALE L.J. 1343 (1970).
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to get on television with their viewpoints, while at the same time
giving ample access to groups with a white citizen's council view.
Each of the cases involved an appeal to the Circuit Court by citizen
groups who were dissatisfied with FCC action granting a renewed
license to WLBT. The results in each case supported community
rights to use FCC processes to gain access and receive information.
In the first case in 1966, the Circuit Court reversed the
Commission's grant of a license to WLBT without having required
a hearing on the issues of service to the public interest. The Court
ruled that the alleged denials of access rights were far too serious to
have been disposed of without a hearing. This reversal placed the
matter back before the Commission. From the opinion in the first
case it appeared that the station would have to prove its case for
renewal by overcoming the implications of its past discriminatory
practices. However, when the case was heard by the FCC's ex-
aminer, he apparently treated the complaining community groups
somewhat like interlopers and required them to bear the burden of
proving the alleged denials of access. The renewal license was then
granted based on the examiner's report. The complaining com-
munity groups again appealed the grant of the license to the Circuit
Court.
In this second United Church case the Court ruled that the
station, not the complaining citizen groups, had the burden of proof
and that the station had plainly failed to establish a showing of
service in the public interest.
72
The United Church cases firmly established the standing of
citizens or of community groups to participate in licensing pro-
ceedings. In the first case judge Burger [now Chief Justice]
analyzed the need and right of citizen intervention with great care.
Acknowledging that Congress intended to have the Commission be
the prime arbiter of the questions of public interest, he found that
this was not a basis for excluding public participation in the task.
Audience participation is not only permissible, but in some instances
it may be necessary to adequate determination of the public interest.
72 In a certain sense the denial of community rights was never finally deter-
mined, at least in the manner to which lawyers are accustomed. The Commission
had implicitly found the denials were well grounded when it granted the one year
probationary license in 1964. The existence of the denials was supposed to have been
fully probed after the first reversal by the Court of Appeals in 1966, but the im-
proper placing of the burden of proof on the complaining parties contaminated that
proceeding. The denials of rights were, however, documented in the hearing, and
the Court noted that it was anomalous that after "more specific documentation of
the licensee's shortcomings" the Commission should have gone ahead to grant a
three-year license. Church of Christ, 425 F.2d 543, 550 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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The theory that the Commission can always effectively represent thelistener interests in a renewal proceeding without the aid and participa-
tion of legitimate listener representatives fulfilling the role of private
attorneys general is one of those assumptions we collectively try to
work with so long as they are reasonably adequate. When it becomes
clear, as it does to us now, that it is no longer a valid assumption which
stands up under the realities of actual experience, neither we nor the
Commission can rely on it ....
Thus we are brought around by analogy to the Supreme Court's reason-ing in Sanders; unless the listeners-the broadcast consumers-canbe heard, there may be no one to bring programming deficiencies or
offensive overcommercialization to the attention of the Commission in
an effective manner. 73
Because the complaining parties in fact could assert elements of
the interest of the listening community they qualified as parties in
interest under the Communications Act.74
The United Church cases do not guarantee standing to all per-
sons who seek to intervene in licensing proceedings. There were
several persons and groups who sought to be heard in the matter
of WLBT's license. The Court stated that given the serious nature
of the allegations "the Commission must allow standing to one or
more of them as responsible representatives to assert and prove the
claims they have urged .... 117 The Court stated that the Com-
mission could exercise its statutory rule making power to establish
reasonable limitations on public intervention. Apparently Commis-
sion rules on intervention are being formulated at this time and canbe expected in the near future. 76 Congress appears to be evidencing
genuine concern that citizen participation rules give the public fair
and readily accessible means of intervention. 77
The second United Church case gave additional strong support
to the role of public intervenors. The Court concentrated on theproper role of the burden of proof. Burden of proof is often the
73 Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d at 1003-05. For the issue of standing,
see id. at 1000-06.
74 The Court specifically rejected the Commission argument that in order tobe a party in interest one must show direct economic injury in a commercial sense.The Supreme Court has recently agreed that aesthetic, conservational, recreational
and other non-economic values have standing to gain protection through the ad-ministrative process. Association of Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
153-54, 172, n.5 (1970).
75 Church of Christ, 359 F.2d at 1006.
76 Letter from the General Counsel of the FCC to the author, Jan. 5, 1971.
77 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure ofthe Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 19-84 (1969) [hereinafter cited as 1969 SenateHearings]. This Senate Subcommittee received responses from various federal agenciesconcerning citizen participation in agency decision making. The Committee has re-
printed those responses here.
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crucial factor in any legal dispute. It is probably impossible to assess
the exact psychological effect of requiring one person or the other
to bear the burden of proving something, but it is easy to see how
important it can be, especially in a difficult case. It is so easy for
the judge, jury or administrator to say, "well, you didn't carry the
burden of proof." The Court's decision that the complaining parties
do not bear the burden eliminates the likelihood that they will be
discounted and gives them a stronger position in the event they
need to challenge the Commission's expertise and findings in
Court. 8 In requiring that applicants meet the burden of proof on
"public interest," public intervenors should be able to emphasize
successfully that service to First Amendment goals is an essential
matter upon which the burden must be carried.
The FCC attitude toward community participation in the
licensing process was explored somewhat by way of a questionnaire
sent to each Commissioner in 1969 by Senator Edward M. Kennedy,
Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice
and Procedure. Rosel H. Hyde, who was Chairman of the Commis-
sion at the time, indicated in his reply that citizen participation had
been significant in a few cases, but that generally the "ordinary
citizen does not play a prominent role in the decision-making
process." He stated that in most cases "the principal input is by
parties having a financial interest in the outcome of the proceeding
and resources sufficient to retain competent professional assistance,
and by the staff of the Commission as representatives of the pub-
liC."7 9 Chairman Hyde expressed a willingness that more citizen
and community participation be encouraged before the Commission.
In response to a specific question about Commission procedures
which take account of the views of the poor, Chairman Hyde stated
that there were no special ways in which the views of the poor were
solicited, but that the needs of the poor would be considered at
licensing proceedings when they constituted a substantial segment
of the community to be served. He stated that the potential broad-
cast licensee would be expected to ascertain the needs of the poor
and schedule programming related to those needs. "Thus, on issues
affecting the poor, the views of the poor are entitled to broadcast
time." Chairman Hyde encouraged any group which had views or
interests relating to FCC action to "articulate its views and state its
needs on the record of the proceeding and to relate them specifically
78 Federal agencies' power to find facts and apply "expertise" creates formidable
obstacles to successful attack on their decisions in court. See K. DAvIs ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW, ch. 29 (1958); L. JAFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL Or ADMINSTRATIVE ACTION
576-85 (1965).
79 See 1969 Senate Hearings supra note 77 at 19.
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to the matters at issue."180 He acknowledged that people who are
not in a position to hire professional assistance for presentation of
their views labor under a serious handicap and deserve a change in
circumstance in order to allow their views to receive full considera-
tion.
Commissioner Nicholas Johnson sent a separate response to
Senator Kennedy. He was highly critical of the FCC's past re-
sponses to citizen group participation. 81 He observed that "the
FCC's initial, instinctive reaction was to oppose, not 'encourage'
greater citizen participation in its proceedings, and that it took a
forceful United States Court of Appeals opinion to preserve this
valuable right" [referring to the first United Church case]. He said
that in the three years since the decision the Commission has done
little to encourage citizen participation. The radio and television in-
dustry dominates the licensing process to the practical exclusion
of citizen effectiveness, and in too many cases "the Commission staff
has simply acquiesced [or been forced to acquiesce] to the in-
dustry's most extravagant demands." Commissioner Johnson agreed
with Chairman Hyde's observation that no special procedures are
available to the poor. He suggested that the Commission take ac-
tions to obtain the views of the poor:
Many procedures could be used, but are not. With respect to a station's
application for renewal of license, or a complaint filed during the license
term, for example, the Commission could solicit the views of the poor
by sending invitations to testify to poverty group leaders, by alerting
poor citizens through the use of circulars, advertisements, and even
television spots placed during popular programs. The Commission might
even obtain time on the television stations in a community [as do
other agencies of government] to announce to the poor and other groups
that the Commission was considering, for example, the renewal or
transfer of a particular station's license, announcing the date, time and
place of the local hearing, and asking for the submission of comments
or personal appearances. Indeed, this time should be made available
to the public free of charge. After all, radio and television stations
operate on publicly-owned frequencies at the suffrance of the public;
the public should not have to pay to discover that hearings are being
held which affect the rights of existing stations to continue their opera-
tions. 82
While there is a difference in view between former Chairman
Hyde and Commissioner Johnson as to how eager the FCC is to
have community participation, there is in each statement solid sup-
port for the role of the community in licensing and rule making.
80 Id. at 22.
81 Id. at 60-7.
82 Id. at 66.
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With both the Commission and the courts supporting community
rights, the next step is effective community use of its rights.
There are examples of effective citizens and community efforts
to change television. One is, of course, the work of the United
Church of Christ and others in Jackson. Others include John
Banzhaf's successful effort to get radio and television stations which
were advertising cigarettes to devote significant time to the case
against cigarettes. The case commenced with Mr. Banzhaf's letter
to a television station in which he asked that free time be provided
to counterbalance cigarette advertisements which "by their por-
trayals of youthful or virile-looking or sophisticated persons en-
joying cigarettes in interesting and exciting situations deliberately
seek to create the impression ... that smoking is socially acceptable
and desirable, manly, and a necessary part of a rich life."83 His efforts
resulted in an FCC ruling requiring stations to provide anti-cigarette
time. There are many possibilities here for efforts to get time for
responses to programming on violence, extreme cultural bias,84 auto-
mobile advertising, 85 attacks on educational and cultural institu-
tions, and advertising of products that may threaten the environ-
ment. The FCC may be persuaded to move in some new areas of
advertising controversy or to generalize further on the reply doc-
trines which were at issue in Red Lion. Movements for response
opportunities should be consistent with the station's rights to develop
its overall program, but with respect to advertising it should also
be noted that to the extent a licensee converts broadcasting into
strictly an advertising game, he diminishes his free expression
position.8
Two recent examples of community challenges to existing
licensees are the Boston WHDH case,8 7 and the Citizens Commu-
nications Center negotiations with Capital Cities Broadcasting
Corporation.8 In the WHDH case a group of local businessmen
and professors filed a competing application for the license of an
83 Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), aff'g the FCC ruling.
84 See note 8, supra.
85 Seeking response time on a variety of issues: assertions that cars are safe or
"smog free," that automobiles provide easy and necessary transportation when mass
transportation means are now necessary, that monthly payments are "painless" and
that you can "afford" to pay them.
86 See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1939); Breard v. City of Alexan-
dria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) ; Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
87 WHDH, Inc., 16 F.C.C. 2d (1969) aff'd Greater Boston Television Corp., -
F.2d - (1970), reopening declined WHDH, Inc., 21 P. & F. Radio Reg. 2d 400
(1971).
88 BROADCASTING, Jan. 11, 1971, at 20-22. See also id. at 23, for a brief report on
the efforts of George Washington University Law School students to get spot an-
nouncements on public rights in station programming and licensing.
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existing Boston station which was up for renewal. The new appli-
cants believed they could demonstrate better service to their com-
munity, and they succeeded, getting the FCC to grant the license to
them. In the Capital Cities negotiations, a citizens' group negotiated
with Capital Cities Corporation and has apparently gotten the
company to agree to commit one million dollars to minority group
and community programming over the next three years. A commu-
nity advisory committtee is to help oversee the use of the money to
help assure that it goes to programming which will achieve the kind
of broadcasting which the citizen group has sought.
As the fall 1971 license renewal period for the San Francisco
bay area television stations approaches, some community groups
have formed to try to effect change in programming and program
control. One of these groups is the Community Coalition for Media
Change. The Coalition's goals are to negotiate agreements with local
licensees to obtain programming and employment opportunities
that meet ethnic community needs. If the negotiations are not suc-
cessful, the Coalition will petition the FCC to deny the station's
renewal applications.8 9 Another group is the Committee for Open
Media, which seeks to gain access to radio and television for repre-
sentative groups from the community. The time periods would be
short commentary periods or spot announcements, and the groups
would gain access by demonstrating numerical community strength
through petitions or some other verifiable means.90 The approach
which COM advocates is similar in some respects to what the
Netherlands broadcasting networks provide. The Dutch system is
apparently to divide up sixty percent of the available broadcast time
among groups with various religious, political and philosophical
viewpoints, granting time in proportion to the number of adher-
ents.9 ' The COM proposal asks for a much smaller amount of time,
perhaps a half hour a day.
Success for community groups which desire change in pro-
gramming and operation of their local stations depends on careful
negotiation. Groups should consider and carefully document the
needs of their communities with respect to the use of radio and
television. They should survey what the stations are actually doing.
The next step is to approach the stations with specific and carefully
drafted proposals. Discussions with the stations should be con-
89 1 MEDIA CHANGE NEWSLETTER No. I (CCMC, 995 Market St., 16th floor,
San Francisco, Cal., Jan. 1971).
90 P. Jacklin, Open Media As Necessary For Democracy In A Technological
Society (Jan. 1971). (Professor at San Jose State College, San Jose, Calif.)
91 The summary concerning the Dutch system is based on a brief article in
ATTAs, Feb. 1971, at 48.
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ducted in a friendly and fair, yet firm way. A persuasive approach
may bring great improvement for both the community and the
station. If negotiations do not work out, then the community group
can consider turning to the FCC with a fully documented case.
VI. CONCLUSION
The community has two essential First Amendment rights in
radio and television broadcasting-the right to receive controversy
and the right of groups to gain access to the media as public forums.
These rights and.other rights of service to the community can re-
ceive protection through negotiation with stations and community
participation in the FCC rule making and licensing processes. After
a careful basis has been developed before the FCC and the Com-
mission procedures have been exhausted, the First Amendment
claimants may then look to the Circuit Court for enforcement of
their rights.
